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Abstract
The command to love one’s enemies (the ‘LE Principle’ as it shall 
henceforth be called) is one of the most striking and counter-
intuitive precepts that have arisen in the Christian tradition. 
However, it has received little philosophical scrutiny. This paper 
aims to fill that gap. I shall first answer two questions behind the 
two main concepts underlying the principle: a) what would count 
as an enemy; b) and what does it mean to love someone. Then, 
after clarifying the relevant concepts, I shall try to examine the 
whether the LE Principle is consistent with two major ethical 
traditions in philosophy: utilitarianism and deontology. I shall 
conclude by affirming that despite the psychological barriers 
inherent in living by the LE Principle, it will be shown to be 
livable and morally praiseworthy
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1 Introduction
Given that Christianity is a major religious tradition, it is not 
surprising that the LE Principle is a moral precept that has long 
occupied the Christian consciousness. However, seen from a 
purely philosophical perspective, the principle has received little 
attention. For instance, in the website philpapers.org, which is the 
largest online database for philosophical papers worldwide, there 
is virtually no article that studies the LE Principle. This gap needs 
to be filled and this paper is an initial step towards it. My approach 
is as follows: I shall first answer two questions behind the two main 
concepts underlying the principle: what would count as an enemy; 
and what it means to love someone. After clarifying the relevant 
concepts, I shall try to examine the validity of the LE Principle 
according to the two major ethical traditions in philosophy: 
utilitarianism and Kantian deontology. I shall conclude by 
affirming that despite the psychological barriers inherent in living 
by the LE Principle, it will be shown to be a moral command that 
is philosophically coherent and consequently, something worthy 
to be practiced.
What counts as an enemy? The Webster Dictionary defines 
enemy as “someone who cherishes resentment or malicious 
purpose towards another.” This definition captures a common 
understanding of an enemy. The presence of resentment or malice 
towards a person is sufficient to make one an enemy. A political 
enemy, for instance, is understood to refer to someone who wishes 
another politician’s downfall, in whatever form it may take. An 
enemy of the state conjures up an image of a person or a group 
of people whose primary goal is the state’s ultimate destruction.
In ordinary life, an enemy is anyone who resents another person’s 
presence, or wishes for that person’s downfall. The definition, in 
fact, describes what may be considered to be Jesus’ own enemies: 
the Sadducees and Pharisees. Jesus, from whom the LE Principle 
originated, often clashed with these religious leaders who are often 
portrayed to be persistently malicious of Jesus. They resented him 
for his natural authority to command a crowd’s attention, and 
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his growing fame.By natural authority, Jesus needed no political 
or religious title (such as the Saducees) in order to command a 
crowd. The Saducees and Pharisees resented him because he was 
becoming more authoritative than they were. It is no wonder that 
such resentment and malice eventually contributed towards Jesus’ 
death.
The definition implies that a person does not need to characterize 
someone as an enemy for one to count as such. So, even a vague 
acquaintance or a stranger can be an enemy as long as that person 
carries resentment or malice towards another person. On the 
contrary, a person may disagree with you or may oppose your 
beliefs or convictions but that person may not necessarily be 
your enemy. Disagreements and oppositions are not necessarily 
malicious by nature. Couples and friends may disagree with each 
other. In this case, a person who disagrees with another need not 
necessarily hold resentment or malice to express his disagreement 
while, on the other hand, a person may not need to have some 
explicit disagreements with one’s viewpoints in order for that 
person to be one’s enemy. It is sufficient for one to hold resentment 
or malice towards a person even if those negative feelings are not 
articulately explained or the causes are not deeply thought about.
What does the LE Principle Mean?
Love is indeed such a very loaded word. In an era of confusing 
messages and conflicting images of love, love may mean many 
things. One thing, however, seems clear: there is no question in 
love when it involves, as its object, the people we care about and 
to whom we express our deepest concern: our families, friends, 
and significant others. So, it becomes problematic when applied 
to certain people who are commonly perceived as not its natural 
receiver: one’s enemies. If there is a non-hateful way to respond 
to one’s enemies, indifference seems more appropriate than love. 
So, why think that love constitutes a better response? Before we 
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answer that, it is necessary to clear out one major misconception 
and clarify what we mean by the term ‘love’. 
Many individuals associate love with strong, usually positive, 
emotions. This is likely because ‘love’ is thought primarily to be 
romantic love. But should love, romantic or otherwise, always 
involve such emotions? It does not seem so. Even in the context 
of romantic love, people are not expected to always have strong 
passionate emotions towards each other. Just the same, parents 
are not expected to always feel positive emotions towards their 
children, just as friends towards each other. Although emotions 
may play a positive role in the dynamics of love (whatever its 
kind), it is sufficient for us to claim that emotions need not be a 
stringent requirement in the act of love. Love need not always 
involve strong emotions. As Wagoner (1997) said: “The ‘trueness’ 
of love cannot be found in its intensity, which may wax or wane, 
but in its moral nature” (p.69).
While I will mention some notions of love, I shall primarily draw 
on phenomenology to uncover what it means to love someone. 
One only needs to look at one’s experience of love and identify 
the reasons for describing such experience as one of love. Such 
phenomenological approach will take ordinary experience as 
the ultimate basis in clarifying the concept in question. I will 
quote scholars to solidify the presuppositions in pre-theoretical 
experience; but they serve to confirm and not to prove. The 
advantage of such an approach is that it does not draw on the validity 
of any major theories on love. We need not even distinguish love 
among its kinds. We only need to look at our own experiences of 
love, and see whether the characteristics given faithfully describe 
these experiences. Since phenomenology is primarily an appeal to 
common experience, it is up to the reader to decide whether the 
two characteristics laid out here will encapsulate their experience 
of love. These two traits of love are so universal that they are likely 
to strike a common cord in every human being. Correspondingly, 
these two manifestations are: a) that love involves complete 
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acceptance of the beloved; and that b) love involves the active 
pursuit of the beloved’s good.
How important is acceptance in the act of loving? Cowburn (2003) 
describes it as “the distilled essence of love, the one element which 
is in all forms of love” (p.19). He suggests one interpretation of 
acceptance: “being in favor of a being who or which is judged 
to be good” (p. 20). In one sense, this is true. Cowburn’s (2003) 
example is that of parents who, after meeting their son’s girlfriend, 
accepted her to be their son’s wife. Their reason is that she is 
delightful and just right for their son. They accepted her because 
of the positive qualities that they find in her. However, to describe 
acceptance only as something solely directed towards the good 
would be incomplete. Complete acceptance involves the whole 
person, not only the good parts. In fact, to say that we completely 
accept someone is to be open to whatever possibility by which 
that someone may reveal herself.
To love someone always implies the full acceptance of the other 
for what she/he really is – with all the strengths and weaknesses, 
the talents as well as the flaws; in other words, the individual’s 
whole humanity. It is not difficult to accept someone’s good 
attributes; in fact, in the case of romantic love, they may be the 
initial reasons for coming to love the beloved. However, complete 
acceptance cannot leave out the beloved’s baser and less desirable 
qualities. Everyone has to come to terms with the beloved’s 
humanity. Humans, always make mistakes. Each has character 
flaws, however hidden, and all the other idiosyncrasies. Without 
commitment to accept both the good and the bad qualities of the 
beloved, no long-term commitment to love is possible.
Before misunderstanding ensues, it should be clear at the 
outset that complete acceptance does not necessarily amount to 
toleration. It is one thing to say that we accept our loved ones 
while quite another to say that we always tolerate them. To accept 
is to be open to the revelation of the other; it is not to resign to it. 
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This truth is clearest in a marriage rite, where the bride accepts 
the groom to be her husband (and vice-versa). By saying “yes” to 
the invitation, the acceptance of both the bride and the groom to 
each other bears out their lifetime commitment to be open to each 
other’s character and personality, quirks, and future decisions. 
However, this does not mean that they may completely tolerate 
even the unhelpful behaviors or bad choices of their spouse. After 
all, there is consistency in saying that we accept our beloved and 
pursue their good as well. 
So what does this imply in the case of one’s enemies? To love our 
enemies is to accept them for what they are – unique individuals 
and capable of deciding on their own. It may be further argued 
that to love our enemies in this sense is to respect their individual 
judgments about us, even if we do not necessarily agree with 
those judgments. As has been emphasized, it is one thing to accept 
the humanity of our enemies while quite another to accept their 
judgments of us as automatically true. We may accept our enemies 
as individuals who have uniquely human capacities and all-too-
human shortcomings but such acceptance does not preclude us 
from insisting on what is right and true.
Nonetheless, an enemy’s view of us may be enlightening by 
revealing certain aspects of ourselves which might be hidden from 
us. A person does not become an enemy by default. An enemy 
has carried resentment and/or malice for certain reasons, justified 
or not. If the reason is justified, then clearly it can serve as an 
opportunity to see ourselves in a new light, and we can change 
ourselves accordingly. If the reason is unjustified, it is likewise 
an opportunity for us to show that the particular judgment is 
distorted. Of course, this is hardly easy in practice, given all the 
complications that may arise. Whatever may be the case, it is now 
clear what is meant by completely accepting one’s enemies. 
Although acceptance is a necessary condition for love, it is not 
sufficient. After all, one can accept another while not necessarily 
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loving her/him. There is indeed more to love than just accepting the 
wholeness of the beloved. Love, in its highest form, involves the 
pursuit of the beloved’s good. Frankfurt (1999) sums this view by 
speaking of “love as a disinterested concern for the well-being or 
flourishing of a beloved object” (p.167). Disinterest is “a concern 
in which the good of the beloved is desired for its own sake rather 
than for the sake of promoting any other interests” (p. 165). Thus, 
to love one’s enemies is to actively seek their (enemies) own good 
for their own sake.
THowever, is this kind of love humanly possible, especially 
when applied to one’s enemies? It is not difficult in the case of 
people whom we value dearly, such as our families, friends, and 
significant others. Frankfurt (1999) observed that there is a kind 
of love that is aroused as a response to the perceived value of its 
object. We love them because they are our family, our friends, or 
our significant others. However, how is it ever possible to love 
our enemies in the sense of seeking their own good? While the 
common objects of one’s love are those that one finds valuable, 
there is a sense, as Frankfurt (1999) suggests, that the act of loving 
is “itself a creator of value” (p. 172).  This love is not derivative 
from the beloved’s value or importance. What Frankfurt (1999) 
wants to point out is that there is inherent value in the act of 
loving, in the sense that we seek the beloved’s good for her/his 
own sake. He stated:
It [love] does not enhance our lives simply by 
connecting us to other valuable things, or by 
fulfilling some presumed responsibility to care 
about whatever things have value on their own. 
Loving is valuable in itself, and not only in virtue 
of the value of its objects. Other things being 
equal, our lives would be worse without it. (p. 
173)
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Such view of love seems compatible with the LE Principle. We 
love our enemies because loving is intrinsically valuable. Love 
is life-enhancing by virtue of moving the lover and the beloved 
towards the good. The capacity to love which expands beyond the 
usual ambit of loving relations enhances the lover. What enhances 
the beloved is that she/he becomes a recipient of love whose origin 
goes beyond the typical people who show love to her/him. This is 
an ideal that when achieved, both parties may win. Again, nobody 
said that it is going to be easy. Even if one seeks the good of the 
enemies, they might misinterpret the actions and retaliate, or they 
might simply be indifferent. Of course, such possibilities do not 
preclude that the enemies may be genuinely moved by the loving 
actions; and may come to see that the resentment and malice they 
keep are misguided.
In our definition of an enemy, it is clear that it is not within 
one’s power if someone becomes an enemy. One may exhibit the 
qualities of a good person and be a paragon of service to humanity 
but this does not necessarily immunize one from enemies. Indeed, 
history has testified that even social reformers and religious saints 
like Mahatma Gandhi and Mother Theresa of Calcutta have their 
own share of enemies. Although the enemies may be moved by 
an attitude of acceptance and concern shown towards them, this 
is something that is up for them to decide, and not within anyone 
else’s power to control. 
Having set the stage, we can now proceed on examining whether 
the LE Principle, which is originally a uniquely Christian ideal, 
can be consistent with the two dominant, albeit opposing, 
ethical traditions in the history of Western philosophy, namely, 
utilitarianism and deontology. However, note that, this paper 
does not intend to completely present a discussion of these 
two traditions. The claims of these ethical traditions have been 
controversial since their beginnings. I will focus on the text 
of philosophers who are recognized as each tradition’s most 
authoritative representative: John Stuart Mill on Utilitarianism 
and Immanuel Kant for Deontological Ethics.
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LE Principle and Utilitarianism
In his famous essay entitled “Utilitarianism”, Mill (2003) set out 
to advance the ethical doctrine of utilitarianism. As the term itself 
suggests, utilitarianism is a moral doctrine that is based on utility, 
or what Mill (2003) called the Greatest Happiness Principle: 
“Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (p. 186). 
In using the term happiness, Mill (2003) meant it as intended 
pleasure and the absence of pain.  Unhappiness is pain and the 
privation of pleasure. This principle needs to be clarified further, 
or it might be wrongly associated with Epicurus, who thought that 
pleasure is the ultimate moral basis for action. Mill (2003) argued 
that Epicurus’ view is rather crude since there is a higher pleasure 
that befits human beings. There is no question that human beings 
possess greater faculties than mere animal appetites. The use of 
these faculties will produce higher pleasures than the satisfaction 
of mere animal instincts. 
Mental pleasures are thus superior to bodily pleasures. However, 
the distinction is more nuanced than what the last statement 
suggests. For instance, imagine basketball or any competitive 
physical game invented by humans. Playing basketball necessarily 
utilizes human body for it to be performed. It is a highly physical 
game. Players might derive various physical pleasures from 
the game, for instance, being able to exercise or strengthen the 
muscles. But to see basketball as solely a physical game from 
which only bodily pleasures can be derived is incorrect. It is a 
physical and mental game. Playing it and more so, playing it 
well involves various strategies that can only be devised through, 
among other things, unique human intelligence. The point is 
that what counts as mental pleasure is not restricted to what is 
commonly considered as intellectual and academic endeavor. We 
cannot dismiss a particular human activity as unproductive of 
mental pleasures just because it appears to be highly physical.
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Another important distinction should be considered and it is “that 
the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is 
right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all 
concerned” (Mill, 2003, p. 194). Thus, with these distinctions in 
place, we can summarize what utilitarianism is, thus, the moral act 
of pursuing the greatest kind of happiness of the greatest number 
of people. 
So, what can utilitarianism say regarding the LE Principle? First 
of all, we should settle whether loving one’s enemies would 
produce happiness of any kind. I think that this can be answered 
by determining whether loving, regardless of the object, elicits 
happiness. I gather that the answer for this is yes. Human beings 
are social by nature. Our ancestors have survived years of 
natural calamities, scarcity of food, and wild predators because 
they have learned to live in communities. It is impossible to live 
one’s whole life without the need for others, in whatever way 
that others can contribute. Even an hermit needs food, tools, and 
material resources, most of which are likely produced by others.
Our modern society might seem to show that individualism and 
independence are noble values. However, without an atmosphere 
of acceptance and love, the world would surely be an intolerable 
place.In the act of loving, both the doer and the recipient benefit. 
Is there any person who genuinely loves but is generally unhappy? 
One might object that loving people who are important and 
valuable to us is enough to fulfill the happiness that arises in 
loving. If the rationale is only to love, and we already have our 
common objects of love, then there is no further reason to love our 
enemies. Indeed, if the need to love is the only basis to produce (a 
particular sort of) happiness, it is expected that people will choose 
the natural objects of their love, not the problematic and unnatural 
ones – the enemies. But what is important at this point is to see 
that the LE Principle is compatible with utilitarianism, even if 
utilitarianism does not morally require it.  
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So if loving produces happiness, is it the higher or lower kind 
of happiness? Does love elicit mental or bodily pleasures? It 
is for the most part of the higher kind. We have characterized 
love as involving acceptance and the disinterested pursuit of the 
beloved’s good. Accepting someone in the sense that we use it 
here is a uniquely human practice. Complete acceptance embraces 
both the desirable and less desirable qualities of the beloved, but 
this presupposes a cognitive capacity to distinguish between the 
two. Also, a disinterested pursuit of the beloved’s good is one 
capacity that separates human beings from all the other animals. 
Nonhuman animals may care for their offspring and some are 
even known to sacrifice their lives for their kind. They do what 
appear to be altruistic acts solely for their gene’s or species’ sake. 
They are acting out of instinct and not by choice. The seemingly 
altruistic acts of animals are always instrumental. Only humans 
are capable of pursuing the beloved’s good for her/his own sake. 
Post (2005) made a summary and assessment of existing research 
data on altruism and its relation to mental and physical health. 
According to Post (2005), based on current research, there is a 
strong correlation between other-regarding behaviors, such as 
love, in connection with a person’s well-being, happiness, and 
health. In fact, Post (2005) concluded his meta-analysis by saying 
that “Life can be difficult, and death should not be denied. Love, 
however, makes the way easier and healthier both for those who 
give and for those who receive” (p. 73). Thus, even empirical 
research provides strong evidence that loving, in general, may 
produce happiness.
It remains unclear, however, whether loving one’s enemies would 
benefit the greatest number of people. Imagine that everyone 
resolves to love his or her enemies: will everyone be better off 
because of living up to the LE Principle? What kind of world 
would this be? There are good reasons to think that this would be 
significantly better, where people are significantly happier. The 
lover is bringing out a great good in the world through spreading 
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good will, as exemplified in love, even to people who are his or 
her enemies. On the lover’s part, this is likely to create peace 
of mind than its opposite counterparts. He or she could even 
see the act of loving one’s enemies as a legitimate reason to be 
happy, precisely because doing so lifts the burden of bitterness 
towards the enemies. Of course, we cannot dismiss the possibility 
that enemies might be equally moved away from bitterness 
and resentment by virtue of experiencing love from someone 
expected to retaliate or be indifferent. Malice answered by malice 
is very unlikely to produce positive emotions like love, peace. or 
fulfillment. Negative emotions like resentment and malice when 
responded with genuine love are likely to transform the receiver 
into having a changed perception or behavior towards the lover. 
Loving the enemies is likely to produce happiness on the part of 
both the lover and enemies. 
In addition, following the LE Principle fosters an atmosphere of 
openness, acceptance, and cooperation where people are inspired 
to help each other and cooperate towards common positive ends. 
People witnessing individuals who love non-preferentially even 
towards their enemies, are naturally moved by such a display of 
character, since it seems unnatural but at the same time heroic. It 
appears unnatural since it goes against common human nature.
We tend to feel resentment towards people who have resentment 
or malice towards us. At the same time, we know that there is 
something heroic and even valuable to responding to negativity 
by way of such a noble action as love, that is, by coming to think 
of the enemies’ good or welfare in spite of their negative attitude 
towards us.
Moreover, such actions cultivate our sympathetic impulses.I It 
inspires us more to become sensitive to the needs not only of our 
enemies but of people in general, and to ways in which we might 
be able to help. Because of such disposition, we are more attuned 
to being able to understand others, and ourselves, and human 
nature with its unique sense of joys and pains in all their diversity. 
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If we have cultivated a loving attitude towards our enemies, as 
emotionally hard as it is to do, then it would be easier to practice 
a general beneficence to people in general. It is an undeniable 
fact that society, as composed of various individuals, definitely 
benefits when people practice beneficence towards individuals 
that they encounter. 
LE Principle and Kant’s Ethics
Another dominant ethical theory in contrast to utilitarianism is 
deontology championed by the German philosopher Immanuel 
Kant. According to Kant (1997), happiness cannot be the ultimate 
basis for morality, as what Mill claimed. For him, happiness, 
which is the complete well-being and satisfaction with one’s 
condition, produces boldness and thereby often arrogance (Kant, 
1997). What can be considered good without qualification is a 
good will. A good will is not good because of its results. It is good 
in itself regardless of the effects it can bring about. 
Kant (1997) does not deny that nature endowed human beings 
with the desire for happiness. Thus, it is natural for human beings 
to take actions to achieve this end. However, the imperatives that 
arise out of this are always conditional. That is, if you want to 
achieve happiness, then you have to perform a corresponding 
action. The reason for action is based on a further end, which 
in this case, is happiness. But Kant (1997) said   that “the true 
vocation of reason must be to produce a will that is good, not 
perhaps as a means to other purposes, but good in itself, for which 
reason is absolutely necessary” (p. 10, italics his). The idea of the 
good will becomes then the ultimate basis “for the total worth of 
our actions and constitutes the condition of all the rest” (p. 10). 
To have a good will is to do something under the imperative of 
duty. However, good will is not exercised merely by acting in 
accordance with duty, but only through doing something out of 
a sense of duty. In this sense, loving one’s enemies would only 
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count as morally good if it is done out of respect for the moral law, 
as exemplified in the LE Principle. To follow the LE Principle to 
achieve a further end, such as to gain a following or to create a 
positive image, would not count as morally good. One must love 
one’s enemies because of the conviction that it is the right thing to 
do, not because it is a means to another end.
So what is the moral law on which moral duties are based? It 
is, according to Kant (1997), the Categorical Imperative. It is the 
“universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle” 
(p. 14). How does one determine whether loving one’s enemies 
is morally to be encouraged? It is by putting it to the test of the 
Categorical Imperative. The imperative has three formulations with 
the first one stated as: “Act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it should become 
a universal law” (p. 31). Although this statement of Kant (1997) 
has gone to a lot of interpretations, what seems clear is the test of 
universalizability that the statement implies. In other words, an act 
is determined as moral if it is universalizable while it is immoral 
if it is not universalizable. A maxim is universalizable if it is to be 
applied by any person faced with a certain situation to where the 
moral principle applies. Pojman and Feiser (2012) symbolized it 
as: “If one judges that act X is right for a certain person P, then it 
is right for anyone relevantly similar to P” (p. 7). If loving one’s 
enemies is universalizable, this means that my doing it implies 
that others should also do it, when faced in a similar situation 
where I apply the principle. So is the maxim universalizable? Can 
I will that it should become a universal law without being charged 
with inconsistency or contradiction? 
According to contemporary American philosopher Christine 
Korsgaard (1985), there are three possible interpretations of what 
Kant (1997) meant by contradiction First, Kant (1997) might 
have meant that the universalization of such a maxim would be 
a logical contradiction, where the proposed action would simply 
be inconceivable.In this sense, our maxim does not seem to 
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commit this. There is no internal contradiction in conceiving a 
world where people love their enemies. There are people, groups, 
and communities who practice it, if not all the time, at least 
some of the time. Thus, if it can be practiced some of the time, 
then there is no logical contradiction in claiming that it can be 
practiced all of the time. All people can practice it without the 
pain of contradicting themselves. Clearly, the principle does not 
mean that we should love our enemies even though we feel hate 
for them. This indeed is a contradiction. How can one love and 
hate the same people at the same time? If there is genuine desire 
to love one’s enemies, then the issue of hate, if present, should be 
addressed first. Nevertheless, the LE Principle in itself entails no 
logical contradiction. Commanding one to love one’s enemies is 
not like commanding one to exist and not exist at the same time. 
On the second interpretation, Kant (1997) might have meant a 
teleological contradiction, where the principle could not function 
as a law within a purposeful and organized system of nature. Take 
for instance his example of suicide. Someone feels sick of life and 
because of despair, reflects whether to kill himself. Is it a violation 
of duty to himself to take his own life? According to Kant (1997), 
it is. Killing oneself would be a teleological contradiction since 
if universalized, it would mean that anyone would have to kill 
himself when faced with despair. This is clearly against a nature 
“whose destination is to impel toward the furtherance of life” 
(p. 31). What Kant (1997) implies is that nature has endowed 
creatures with the desire to further and protect one’s life so to go 
against this natural desire would be contradictory. Thus, suicide as 
a moral principle commits teleological contradiction. 
Whatever the merit of this example, what is important is how 
it illustrates what is meant by teleological contradiction. When 
applied to the LE Principle, there seems to be no reason to suppose 
that it will not function in the system of nature. It would actually 
seem to contribute positively to the flourishing of human beings. 
Since nature is endowed to further the survival of a species, 
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adherence to LE Principle would help improve the quality of 
human communities by engendering the spirit of acceptance, 
charity, and trust as components of a healthy society.
The third interpretation is one of practical contradiction, where 
an action would become ineffective for achieving its purpose if 
everyone tried to use it for that purpose. Kant’s (1997) example is 
making a promise. Someone finds himself in need of money. He 
wants to borrow money but he also knows that he will be unable 
to pay it. Suppose that he proceeds in borrowing. The principle 
behind his action would be “When I believe myself to be in need 
of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even 
though I know that this will never happen” (p. 32). The action 
commits a practical contradiction. If everyone would promise 
with the intention of not fulfilling it, then no one would believe 
a promise anymore and so, any act of promising would become 
ineffective.
Does the LE Principle commit this contradiction? It is clear that it 
does not. We have already seen that one major purpose for loving 
one’s enemies is because love is itself a good thing, whoever the 
object of that love is. In this sense, there seems to be no good 
reason to think that such purpose would be defeated if everybody 
follows the principle. For something to be a genuine love, it does 
not necessarily imply that the beloved loves back. The purpose is 
not defeated, even if one’s enemies do not reciprocate.  
Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative runs as 
follows: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any another, always at the 
same time as an end and never merely as a means” (p. 31). What 
does this formulation mean? It does not mean that we can never 
treat other people as means. Teachers are means to their students’ 
education. Employees are means to the business owner’s aims 
and goals. Rather, we should never treat people merely as means. 
People should not be treated like objects, which are incapable 
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of valuing and deciding for themselves. Any violation of human 
rights is thus immoral since it treats human beings as mere means 
to another’s end. By saying that we should treat humanity always 
as an end is to recognize that human beings are rational and that 
their humanity, their capacities, preferences, and the like, should 
always be taken into consideration. 
Does the LE Principle fulfill the requirement for this second 
formulation? Love is a manifestation of identifying people as ends 
in themselves, as persons of great value. A complete acceptance 
of the enemy is the recognition of his or her full, albeit imperfect, 
humanity. Seeking the good and welfare of people shows a 
recognition that people ought to be loved, no matter who they 
are or their status in life. Indeed, loving in this sense goes beyond 
the requirement for Kant’s second formulation since what the 
imperative states is just a command for the respect of people, 
a recognition that their concerns should be taken into account. 
However, love is more than just respect; it is to recognize what 
good will benefit the beloved and work towards it. Thus, the LE 
Principle is not just compatible with the second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative; it even goes beyond its basic requirements. 
So far we have seen that loving one’s enemies does not have any 
morally objectionable reasons not to be practiced. Considered under 
the lens of utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, it is philosophically 
unobjectionable. However, as is clear in the previous discussion, 
it is nowhere stated that utilitarianism or Kantian ethics takes the 
LE Principle as morally obligatory. What we can only say is that 
both traditions may see the LE Principle as morally permissible, 
without pain of contradiction. However, moral permissibility is 
too weak a reason to be a motivating factor for action. For one, I 
am morally permitted to eat sandwich for dinner but doing it does 
not make me a moral hero. Nevertheless, we can see the moral 
value of adhering to the LE Principle from another lens, which is 
that of supererogation. 
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Finally, we turn to the biting reality of everyday life. That is, 
loving one’s enemies is an emotionally difficult thing to do or 
practice. Should the fact that it is naturally hard to practice make 
us question the over-all viability of it as a guiding principle in 
one’s life? Before we answer this question, it is important to trace 
the roots of this emotional impediment. Why do people find the 
principle hard to practice? I think it is because we perceive our 
acts of love in connection to the people who deserve them. It is 
hard to love enemies precisely because we feel that enemies are 
not deserving of love, especially by the people who are the object 
of their resentment or malice. It does not seem fair that in spite 
of one’s negative disposition towards the other, the other would 
respond with love, instead of indifference or hate. This goes 
against the common principle of reciprocity that is important in 
every society. 
Perhaps what is to be addressed is the roots of this emotion 
and assess whether the cause of this emotion justifies or not the 
emotion itself. It seems that by now it is clear that there is nothing, 
even the negative emotions, that would nullify the moral worth of 
loving the enemies. In light of all that have been said in favour 
of loving the enemies, it seems that all the potential good that 
its practice can bring – to the lover, the beloved, and to society 
in general – far outweighs the emotional disvalue brought about 
by its practice. Moreover, the practice of loving one’s enemies 
does not preclude that we should have no negative emotions 
whatsoever. It is expected that certain virtues would go against 
the dictates of our baser nature as humans. Loving our enemies is 
best when practiced with a pure spirit and a fully benevolent heart; 
but it does not mean that without these components, the practice 
would not be morally praiseworthy. It is important is that we 
practice it, even if we may not feel like it. It is very likely that with 
constant practice, the emotional hindrance will be transformed 
into a disposition to embody love in our character and to manifest 
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this love to every person we meet; no matter how they relate to us 
or to everybody else.
Following the LE Principle is mired with difficulty. Nobody 
claimed that it is going to be easy. Knowing someone who loves, 
instead of hate, his or her enemies would be morally inspiring in 
part because we seldom encounter such people. We admire those 
who love selflessly, and we may be moved to imitate them. In 
actual practice however, what is usually inspiring and admirable 
comes out as overwhelmingly difficult. However, just because it 
is not easy does not mean that it is impossible. It all comes down 
to each of us whether to rise to the challenge. 
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